FREE hit counter and Internet traffic statistics from freestats.com


HOME 

SEARCH 

NEWS SERVICE 

LETTERS 

ABOUT DV CONTACT SUBMISSIONS

 

Putting the Bosses First
How the Democrats Moved to the Right to Cater to Business
by Lee Sustar
www.dissidentvoice.org
September 28, 2004
First Published in Socialist Worker

Send this page to a friend! (click here)

 

Few on the left will disagree that John Kerryís Democratic Party is corporatized, conservative and cowardly. But itís the best we can do, the Anybody-But-Bush argument goes, until the liberal wing of the party reasserts itself against the conservative Democratic Leadership Council (DLC).

Thereís no question that the DLC--an organized faction in the party once derided as the "Democratic Leisure Class" by Rev. Jesse Jackson--played a major role in dragging the Democrats to the right. Formed in 1985, its stated aim was to distance the party from "special interests" (translation: labor unions, African Americans, womenís organizations) to make the Democrats "electable" in the post-Reagan era.

The DLC put forward an agenda explicitly aimed at winning support from Corporate America--free trade, deregulation, law and order, and cutbacks in government spending, particularly on programs for the poor. Its strategy for the party focused on election appeals to "swing voters"--invariably seen by the DLC as middle-class white men living in the suburbs.

"The boundaries of the mainstream were defined by the DLCís donors from Corporate America--ARCO, the American Petroleum Institute, Dow Chemical, Prudential Bache, Georgia Pacific, Martin Marietta and many others," wrote liberal journalist William Greider in Who Will Tell the People? in 1992. Conservative southern and western Democrats dominated in the leadership of the DLC--including Bill Clinton and Al Gore, who both took a turn as the organizationís chair.

The DLC set the course for the Democratic Partyís move to the right. But what some forget is that the liberal wing of the party not only adapted to this rightward turn, but also helped to consolidate it.

Thatís because the underlying reason for the Democratsí move to the right isnít the DLC itself, but a shift in U.S. politics that began in the mid-1970s with the end of the long post-Second World War economic boom. Corporate America reacted to the decline of U.S. economic power by seeking to dismantle the welfare state and cut workersí living standards through privatization, deregulation and "flexible" labor policies--policies today known as "neoliberalism."

In 1978, United Auto Workers President Doug Fraser denounced the "leaders of the business community" for having "chosen to wage a one-sided class war" and "broken and discarded the fragile, unwritten compact previously existing during a period of growth and progress." But it was laborís choice in 1976, Democratic President Jimmy Carter, who began implementing the new agenda with huge cuts in social spending and a buildup of the military.

Carterís right turn created an opening for the Republican right led by Ronald Reagan--forces previously seen as outside the U.S. political mainstream--in the 1980 elections. Carter mouthed some liberal slogans to fend off a challenge from Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) in the Democratic primaries in 1980--and then imitated Reaganís calls to balance the budget in the general election.

Carterís terrible record--and his echoing of Reagan--doomed him to defeat. Kennedyís opposition to Carter had burnished his image as the standard-bearer of Democratic Party liberalism. Yet Kennedy used his influence to move the party to the right as well.

It was Kennedy who called for deregulation of the airline and trucking industries as early as 1974, two years before Carter was elected. "[Kennedy] won Carter to the cause in the 1976 campaign and ultimately gave the president the issue," the Boston Globe noted.

The consequences of Kennedy-sponsored deregulation are still being felt in the series of airline bankruptcies today and the virtual deunionization of the trucking industry. More recently, Kennedy gave political cover to two of George W. Bushís policy initiatives--the No Child Left Behind education bill and the Medicare prescription drug benefits.

In both cases, Kennedy later denounced the administration--for underfunding No Child Left Behind, and for undermining Medicare finances in the final version of its legislation. Yet Kennedy negotiated with the Bush White House in the first place because he shares the economic and political assumptions of neoliberalism--for example, providing market incentives to pharmaceutical giants for Medicare prescription drugs.

Kennedyís support for the corporate agenda could also be seen in Congressí recent bailout for underfunded pensions, which allows companies to lower their payments to pension funds--a move that will only deepen the crisis later on.

Once figures like Kennedy started embracing neoliberal policies, Democrats began searching for a new political formula that would appease corporate donors while still mobilizing the partyís traditional base of workers, African Americans and women. Pioneering this approach was Colorado Sen. Gary Hart, who had established his liberal credentials as campaign manager for George McGovern in 1972.

As a candidate for president in 1984, however, Hart was "one of the younger breed of pragmatic liberals who does not flinch from some of President Reagan's budget cuts," as the Associated Press put it. After Hartís campaign imploded in a sex scandal, the eventual Democratic nominee, Carterís vice president Walter Mondale, campaigned on raising taxes to overcome Reaganís budget deficits. Mondaleís approach excluded any discussion of restoring social programs cut by Reagan--let alone creating new ones--and Reagan won big.

The Democratsí right turn did lead to a backlash among Democratic liberals, expressed in Jesse Jacksonís 1984 and 1988 presidential campaigns. In his second run, Jackson won 7 million votes, 30 percent of the total. But instead of using his influence to turn his Rainbow Coalition into a membership organization, he folded the operation.

Jackson himself embraced the Democratsí turn toward business with the launch of his Wall Street Project in 1997, an effort to promote investment by African Americans and hiring of Blacks by leading corporations. At a time when CEO pay was spiraling and social inequality worsening, Jackson gave credence to the idea of trickle-down economics.

Meanwhile, the Black elected officials elected in the wake of the civil rights and Black Power movements today function as loyal machine politicians. As journalists Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman pointed out last year, the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation receives funding from giant companies such as BP Amoco, General Motors, Anheuser Busch and R.J. Reynolds--raising the question of whether "like the vast majority of members of Congress, the caucus has been bought off by the corporate commercial interests."

The convergence of the Democratsí and Republicansí policies was made clear by Michael Dukakis in his acceptance speech for the 1988 Democratic presidential nomination to run against George Bush Sr. "This election isnít about ideology," he said. "Itís about competence"--that is, the question of who can more effectively manage the partiesí shared agenda.

Dukakisí loss taught Bill Clinton a lesson. Clinton made the promise of a real reform--a national health care plan--the centerpiece of his 1992 election campaign. At the same time, he appealed to conservatives by playing the race card through his support for the death penalty and law-and-order policies. Once in the White House, the health care plan died after Clintonís clumsy attempt to combine a market-based approach with a complex bureaucracy. It was easy meat for industry lobbyists.

Following the Republicansí capture of Congress in 1994, Clinton tacked slightly to the left of the Republicans while competing for the same corporate cash in political donations to win re-election in 1996. The result: the shrinking of the federal government to it smallest size in 40 years, the abolition of federal welfare, the criminalization of Black men, a further decline of labor union power and the deregulation of finance and telecommunications.

Meanwhile, Clinton tended to the interests of the military-industrial complex by presiding over the expansion of NATO and launching a series of "humanitarian" military interventions--what Andrew Bacevich, author of American Empire, summarized as "the unprecedented militarization of U.S. foreign policy."

Clintonís pro-corporate policies shaped Al Goreís 2000 campaign--so much so that Gore was reluctant to appeal the Democratic Partyís base lest populist rhetoric upset his corporate backers or raise potentially destabilizing expectations of gains for working people. John Kerry, of course, has veered even further to the right.

Having concluded that the Democratic "base"--African Americans, unions, progressives--is in the bag, Kerryís handlers think that a support-the-war, cut-the-deficit platform will keep the CEOs sweet, while appealing to Republican-leaning swing voters. Thatís why the 2004 presidential election isnít about ideology. Itís about maintaining the neoliberal consensus in U.S. politics--one that will remain in place until the left is strong enough to challenge it.

Lee Sustar writes regularly for Socialist Worker, where this article first appeared. He can be contacted at: lsustar@ameritech.net.

Other Articles by Lee Sustar

* Whatís Driving the Attack on Pensions?
* What the US Has in Store for Iraq
* The Roots of the Resistance
* Whatís to Blame for Lost Jobs?
* Bushís Right-Wing Allies in Spain Defeated after Madrid Bombing
* How Washington Set the Stage for Haitiís Uprising

 

HOME