was just what the spin doctors ordered: good clean images of Saddam Hussein
nice and dirty, a triumphant end to a diplomatically disastrous week. In the
days leading up to the capture, the White House found itself under fire from
all sides — not just from its usual critics, but even from its most loyal
cheerleaders in Washington’s neo-conservative think tanks. The charge? Grand
Just as former Secretary of State James Baker was being dispatched to woo European governments to forgive Iraq’s foreign debt, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz was punishing those same governments by shutting them out of $18.6 billion in reconstruction contracts.
“It simply looks like the left hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing,” said Doug Bandow, a senior analyst at the Washington-based Cato Institute.
But Baker hardly needed Wolfowitz to make his mission look hypocritical; one can scarcely imagine an act more rife with historical ironies than James Baker impersonating Bono on Iraq’s debt. The Iraqi people “should not be saddled with the debt of a brutal regime that was more interested in using funds to build palaces and build torture chambers and brutalize the Iraqi people,” said White House spokesman Scott McClellan.
No argument here. But when I heard about Baker’s “noble mission,” as Bush described it, I couldn’t help thinking about an under-reported story from earlier this month. On December 4, the Miami Herald published excerpts from a declassified State Department document. It is the transcript of a meeting held on October 7, 1976 between Henry Kissinger, then Secretary of State under Gerald Ford, and Argentina’s Foreign Minister under the military dictatorship, Navy Adm. César Augusto Guzzetti.
It was the height of Argentina’s “dirty war,” a scientifically executed campaign to destroy the “Marxist threat” in Argentina by systematically torturing and killing not only armed guerrillas, but also peaceful union organizers, student activists, as well as their friends, families and sympathizers. By the end of the dictatorship, approximately 30,000 people had been “disappeared.”
At the time of the Kissinger-Guzzetti meeting at the Waldorf Astoria in New York, much of Argentina’s left had already been erased, and news of the bodies washing up on the banks of the Rio de la Plata was drawing increasingly urgent calls for economic sanctions against the Junta. Yet the transcript of the meeting between Kissinger and Guzzetti reveals that that the U.S. government not only knew about the disappearances, it openly approved of them.
Guzzetti reports to Kissinger on “the very good results in the last four months. The terrorist organizations have been dismantled.” After discussing the international outcry, Kissinger states that, “Look, our basic attitude is that we would like you to succeed. I have an old-fashioned view that friends ought to be supported. What is not understood in the United States is that you have a civil war. We read about human rights problems but not the context. The quicker you succeed, the better.”
And here is where Mr. Baker’s present day mission becomes relevant. Kissinger quickly moves on to the topic of loans, encouraging Guzzetti to apply for as much foreign assistance as possible and fast, before Argentina’s “human rights problem” ties the hands of the U.S. administration. “There are two loans in the bank,” Kissinger says, referring to the Inter-American Development Bank. “We have no intention of voting against them.” He also instructs the Minister to, “Proceed with your Export-Import Bank requests. We would like your economic program to succeed and will do our best to help you.”
The World Bank estimates that roughly $10-billion of the money borrowed by the Generals went to military purchases, used to build the concentration camps from which thousands never re-emerged, and to buy hardware for the Falklands War. It also went into numbered Swiss bank accounts, a sum impossible to track because the Generals destroyed all records relating to the loans on their way out the door.
We do know this: under the dictatorship, Argentina’s external debt ballooned from $7.7-billion in 1975 to $46-billion in 1982. Ever since, the country has been caught in an escalating crisis, borrowing billions to pay interest on that original, illegitimate debt, which today is only slightly higher than that held by Iraq’s foreign creditors: $141-billion.
The Kissinger transcript proves that the U.S. knowingly gave both money and high-level political encouragement to the Generals’ genocidal campaign. And yet despite its now irrefutable complicity in Argentina’s great tragedy, the U.S. has consistently opposed all attempts to cancel the country’s debt.
And Argentina is hardly an exceptional case. For decades, the U.S. government has used its power in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to block campaigns to cancel debts accumulated under Apartheid in South Africa, the Marcos kleptocracy in the Philippines, Duvalier’s brutally corrupt regime in Haiti, the long military dictatorship that sent Brazil’s debt spiraling from $5.7 billion in 1964 to $104-billion in 1985. And the list goes on.
The U.S. position has been that wiping out these debts would lead to dangerous precedents (and of course would rob Washington of the leverage it needs to push for investor-friendly economic reforms). So why now is Bush so concerned that “The future of the Iraqi people should not be mortgaged to the enormous burden of debt?” Because it is taking money away from “reconstruction”, money that could be going to Halliburton, Bechtel, Exxon and Boeing.
It has become popular to claim that the White House has been high-jacked by neo-conservative ideologues, men so in love with free-market dogma that they cannot see reason or pragmatism. I’m not convinced. If there’s one thing last week’s diplomatic dustups make clear, it’s that the underlying ideology of the Bush White House isn’t neo-conservatism, it’s old-fashioned greed. While neo-cons worship a set of abstract free-market rules, there is really only one rule that appears to matter to the Bush clan: if it helps our friends get even richer, do it.
Seen through this lens, the seemingly erratic behaviour coming out of Washington starts to make a lot more sense. Sure, Wolfowitz’s contract-hogging openly flouts the free market principles of competition and government non-intervention. But like Baker’s jubilee, it does have a direct and immediate benefit for the firms closest to the Bush administration. Not only are they buying a debt-free Iraq, but they won’t have to compete for the deals with their European corporate rivals.
The entire reconstruction project defies more neo-con tenets, sending this year’s U.S. deficit to a cartoonish $500-billion, with plenty of it handed out in no-bid contracts, creating the kind of monopoly that allowed Halliburton to overcharge an estimated $61-million for imported gasoline in Iraq.
Those looking for ideology in the White House should consider this: for the men who rule our world, rules are for other people. The truly powerful feed ideology to the masses like fast food (or fake Thanksgiving turkey) while they dine on the most rarefied delicacy of all: impunity.
Naomi Klein is a leading anti-sweatshop activist, and author of Fences and Windows: Dispatches from the Front Lines of the Globalization Debate? (Picador, 2002) and No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies (Picador, 2000). Visit the No Logo website: www.nologo.org.
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